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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between financial development (as measured by 
expansion of domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP) and growth for a sample 
of 65 less developed countries over a long period, 1980-2006. Using causality tests at 
various lag-orders we find a strong evidence of mutual causation. We have used 
alternative dynamic panel data models to estimate the relationships between the two.  
While the mean group model suggests no relationship in either direction, the pooled 
mean group model and dynamic fixed effect model show two opposite long-term 
relationships: finance-to-growth relationship is negative whereas growth-to-finance link 
is positive.  
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I. Introduction 
 
A developed financial sector is often considered to be a pre-requisite for economic 
development. Following the discussion of the relationship between money capitalists and 
industrial capitalists by Karl Marx (Capital Vol. III), Hilferding (1910) examined how 
banks became important suppliers of credit. He argued that as bank credit increasingly 
consisted of financing investment projects, banks started to develop a growing interest in 
the long-term health of industrial borrowers (Schaberg, 1999). 
 
Even before Marx, ‘the growth-enhancing view of financial intermediation’ was stressed 
by Hamilton (in 1781), as Levine et al (2000, p.35) pointed out. Levine (1997) and 
Levine et al (2000) mentioned the 1873-work of W. Bagehot who stressed the role of 
financial system in ‘igniting industrialization in England through mobilisation of capital’. 
  
In the early last century, we find Schumpeter (1911) to emphasize a positive role for 
financial services in promoting growth and development. He argued that the services 
provided by financial intermediaries such as mobilisation of savings, evaluation of 
projects, management of risks and facilitation of transactions are essential for 
technological innovation and economic development. The work of Gerschenkron (1962) 
supported the standpoint of Schumpeter (1911); he examined European industrialization 
from the mid-19th century to World War I and observed that financial intermediaries 
played a great role in economic development.  
 
Many economists, however, do not believe that the finance-growth relationship is 
important, as Levine (1997) commented in the survey of literature in this field: the 
collection of essays by the ‘pioneers in development economics’ (in Meier and Seers, 
1984) does not mention finance; Stern’s (1989) review of development economics does 
not discuss the financial system even in a section that lists omitted topics; one of the 
proponents of new growth theory, Lucas (1988) asserts that economists ‘badly over-
stress’ the role of financial factors in economic growth.  
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In this perspective our study seeks to analyze the current experiences of less developed 
countries (by which we mean non-OECD countries including Korea and Mexico, 
excluding Israel and the transitional countries of East Europe), hereafter LDCs. We are 
concerned with the existence of a meaningful relationship between financial development 
and growth: the existence of a stable path from a short-run relationship to a long-run 
relationship.  
 
In the next section (Section II) we shall discuss in brief some major works in this field 
and on the basis of this brief survey we shall identify our research questions. Finally in 
Section III we shall present our findings along with our concluding comments. 
 
II. Financial Development and Growth 
 
Finance-Growth Link: Is it a chicken-egg problem? 
 
Does chicken (say, financial development) precede egg (growth) or does egg precede 
chicken?  In the literature there is no unequivocal answer to this question. Patrick (1966) 
identified two possible patterns in the casual relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. One is the ‘demand-following’ pattern: growth induces an 
expansion of the financial system; the lack of financial growth is a manifestation of the 
lack of demand for financial services. As the real side of the economy develops, demands 
for various new financial services crop up and these are met from the financial side. As 
Robinson (1952) wrote: ‘where enterprise leads, finance follows’.   
 
In the second pattern the expansion of the financial system precedes the demand for its 
services. Channelling scarce resources from savers to investors the financial sector 
induces real growth. Patrick (1966) argued that the direction of causality changes in the 
process of development. In the early stages of development, ‘supply-leading’ pattern is 
important. In the later stages, ‘the supply-leading impetus gradually becomes less 
important, and the demand-following financial response becomes dominant’ (Patrick, 
1966, p.177). 
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The proposition of Patrick (1966) was supported by Jung (1986); he used some time 
series data (since the early 1950s till late 1970s) for 56 countries of which 19 are 
developed countries, hereafter DCs and observed that LDCs are characterized by the 
causal direction running from financial to economic development and DCs by the reverse 
causal direction. The reverse causal direction (from growth to financial development) was 
noted by Shan et al (2001) for a number of DCs and no causal relationship for some DCs. 
 
How Does Financial Development Promote Growth? 
 
There are, however, many scholars who emphasized the uni-directional positive link – 
from financial development to growth. Cameron et al (1967) pointed out that there are a 
number of historical instances in which financial institutions played a leading role in the 
development process. The works of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) offered detailed arguments and evidence for the role of finance in promoting long-
run growth. They stressed the role of financial repression as manifested in government 
interventions in the financial sector, such as ceilings on interest rates and directed credit 
programs, in hampering financial development and thereby reducing rates of capital 
accumulation and productivity growth. Goldsmith (1969, p.400) argued that the financial 
superstructure of an economy ‘accelerates economic growth and improves economic 
performance to the extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to 
the place in the economic system where the funds will yield the highest social return’. 
 
Some growth models in the line of endogenous growth theory (see Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990 and Bencivenga and Smith, 1991) have explicated the role of services 
provided by the financial intermediaries. According to these models, the financial 
intermediaries gather and analyze information and facilitate better risk sharing among 
individuals, thus allowing credit to be allocated more efficiently. 
 
Through the survey of the existing literature two distinct channels of finance-led growth 
were identified by Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005). The first channel stresses the 
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role of intermediaries in allocating resources more efficiently. This ‘‘total factor 
productivity’’ channel operates through innovative financial technologies that improve 
informational asymmetries and lead to better project selection and monitoring (King and 
Levine, 1993). The second ‘‘factor accumulation’’ channel focuses on the spread of  the 
organized finance in the place of self-finance and the resulting improvements in the 
ability of intermediaries to mobilize otherwise unproductive resources  (Gurley and 
Shaw, 1955; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Bell and Rousseau, 2001). 
 
Financial Development Promotes Growth: What the existing studies show 
 
A large number of studies provided an over-whelming support to the proposition that 
financial development promotes growth. It is beyond the scope of the present study to 
provide an exhaustive list of studies supporting the proposition. We just mention here 
some of the major works. The historical evidence in support of the proposition comes 
from Rousseau and Wachtel (1998): studying the experience of five industrialized 
countries over the period 1870–1929, they found strong uni-directional links from finance 
to growth.  Fry (1978) provided the support of the proposition from post-Second World 
War experience of some LDCs: He studied the experience of seven Asian countries such 
as India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Burma over the period 
starting from early 1960s to the early 1970s; his pooled time series analysis supported the 
view that ‘financial conditions do influence saving and growth’.   
 
There are many other cross-country studies supporting the positive effect of finance on 
growth. Gregorio and Guidoti (1995), for example, examined the empirical relationship 
between growth and financial development, proxied by the ratio between bank credit to 
the private sector and GDP and found that this proxy is positively correlated within a 
large cross-country sample. Levine and Zervos (1998), taking a similar cross-country 
approach, found that the development of banks and stock markets also has a positive 
effect on growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) studied a large sample of countries and 
observed that financial development has a substantial supportive influence on the rate of 
economic growth.  
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There are many time-series studies that also supported the findings of cross-section 
studies. Bell and Rousseau (2001) studied the Indian experience for post-independence 
period and found that financial intermediaries played a more emphatic role in promoting 
investment than in increasing total factor productivity. More recently Rousseau and 
Vuthipadadorn (2005) studied the experience of 10 Asian countries (India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) from 
1950 to 2000 and found a strong uni-directional link from finance to investment for most 
of these countries. They concluded that ‘resource mobilization may be the key 
mechanism at work’ and supported the seminal studies of Gerschenkron (1962) and 
Cameron et al (1967), which emphasized the role of finance in the early stages of 
economic development.  
 
Aghion et al (2005) had a different view, somewhat classical (once reinstated by Milton 
Friedman and his followers): finance matters in the short-run adjustment process but not 
in the long-run steady state equilibrium. They developed and tested a Schumpeterian 
model of cross-country convergence with financial constraints and concluded that ‘all 
countries above some critical level of financial development   should converge in growth 
rate, and that in such countries financial development has a positive but eventually 
vanishing effect on steady-state GDP’. They empirically verified these propositions 
through a cross-country growth regression and found a direct effect of financial 
development on growth convergence. 
 
Case for Financial liberalisation 
 
In view of the importance of finance for economic growth Fry (1980, 1997) argued in 
favour of financial liberalisation to facilitate the process. Through a series of studies Ross 
Levine strongly supported financial liberalisation because of its favourable effect on 
growth (see for example, King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 
1998; Levine et al 2000; Beck et al, 2000; Levine 2001; Levine 2003). Demetriades and 
Luintel (1996) studied the experience of India and found a negative effect of financial 
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repression on India’s economic growth. In another study, Quinn (1997) showed that the 
higher the degree of financial openness (measured by some indices calculated by him), 
the higher would be the growth rate of a country. 
 
Sceptical View on Finance-to-Growth Positive Link 
 
There are a number of studies which are somewhat sceptical. For instance, Dornbusch 
and Reynoso (1989) observed through a scatter of points for 84 LDCs that the correlation 
of growth and financial deepening is not tight. Demetriades and Hussain (1996) found 
little evidence for an independent influence of financial development on growth for the 
16 LDCs they have studied. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) observed that in the case of 
South Korea, the real rate of interest had a negative effect on output; ‘financial repression 
seems to have worked’ favourably on their financial development and growth. This 
supported the World Bank (1993) project report on ‘East Asian Miracle’ that states that a 
‘policy of moderate financial repression at positive interest rates may have boosted 
aggregate investment and growth’ in the High Performing Asian Economies ‘by 
transferring income from depositors, primarily households, to borrowers, primarily 
firms’. Arestis and Demetriades (1997, p.796), however, pointed out that the same 
policies followed by India had negative effects as observed by Demetriades and Luintel 
(1996) and commented that ‘the effects of financial liberalisation depend upon the 
institutional context of the economy in question and, particularly, the existence or 
otherwise of good governance’. 
 
There are also some theoretical works which suggest a negative effect of financial 
development on growth (Wijnbergen, 1983; Buffie, 1984). This arises from the 
possibility that financial intermediaries can compete with domestic firms, which could 
lead to a credit crunch that lowers investment and productivity. 
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Research Questions of the Present Study 
 
On the basis of this survey of literature we have identified the following research 
questions which we would like to re-examine: 
 
Is there any causal relationship between financial development and growth?  If the 
answer is yes, what is the direction of causality? Does the direction of causality runs from 
finance to growth or does the arrow runs in the opposite direction? What is the nature of 
the relationship? Does financial development promote growth? Or does it hamper 
growth?  What is the effect of growth on financial development? 
 
 In the next section we shall seek answers to these interlinked questions with the aid of a 
number of alternative dynamic panel data models. 
 
III. Domestic Credit and Growth of the LDCs, 1980-2006 
 
Our Choice of Variables, Sample Selection and Data Source 
 
As a proxy for financial development we shall use only one indicator – credit advanced 
by banks and other financial intermediaries to the domestic sector (as percentage of 
GDP), DCPVTY. It covers the activities of banks and other financial institutions which 
are expected to facilitate economic development by easing the credit constraints of the 
private sector. It is the single most important indicator of financial development (in 
contrast to other indicators) which keeps us more focused in our study of the finance-
growth link. For growth we shall use the rate of growth of real GDP per capita (PCYG). 
 
The data on PCYG and DCPVTY are readily available over a long period for a large 
number of countries from the well-known source of World Bank (World Development 
Indicators, available online). Our choice of panel (years and countries) is based on the 
availability of data for as many countries/years as possible (without a single missing 
observation). Thus we have a perfectly balanced sample of 65 countries  over a period 
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covering 1980-2006. Our coverage of large time period (with no missing data) is very 
useful (if not a necessity) for the use of the advanced tools of time-series econometrics in 
the context of panel data. 
 
Stationarity of the Series: Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
First we have examined the stationarity property of the series.  Using a number of tests 
we find that the financial development indicator (DCPVTY)   is first difference 
stationary. In level terms this series is observed to be stationary in some tests and non-
stationary in other tests.  The series on growth rate (PCYG) is stationary irrespective of 
whether we assume only individual country fixed effects or both fixed effects and trends 
(Table 1).   
 
Granger Causality Tests  
 
To test whether a causal relationship exists between financial development and growth 
we have undertaken VAR (Vector Auto Regressive) and VEC (Vector Error Correction) 
Granger Causality tests.  The lag-order in each case has been determined with the aid of 
Lag Exclusion Wald Test (jointly for both variables). Examining all the cases up to 10 
lags we have chosen a 6-lag VAR model. Following Toda and Yamamoto (1995) we 
have also considered a 7-lag order VAR model (6 plus 1 for the possible maximum order 
of integration of the two series). On both lags, the null hypothesis of no-causality is 
rejected at very high levels of significance irrespective of whether the dependent variable 
is the growth rate or the financial development indicator, DCPVTY (Table 2). That is to 
say, a mutual causal relationship exists between growth and financial development.   
 
For VEC Granger Causality Test the lag-order is chosen to be 5. Both 5-lag and 6-lag 
VEC Granger causality tests support this mutual causation. We have also considered all 
the conceivable lags from 2 to 10 and conducted the VAR and VEC Granger causality 
tests and found strong evidence in favour of mutual causation in most of the cases. 
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Long-run and Short-run Relationship between Financial Development and Growth: 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
 
To ascertain the nature of the relationship between growth and financial development we 
shall use dynamic panel data model. For a large time dimension of panel data (as we have 
here), Pesaran and Smith (1995) showed that the traditional procedures for estimation of 
pooled models, such as the fixed effects, instrumental variables, and generalized method 
of moments (GMM) ‘can produce inconsistent, and potentially very misleading estimates 
of the average values of the parameters in dynamic panel data models unless the slope 
coefficients are in fact identical (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.622).   
 
We postulate a long-run relationship between growth (PCYG) and financial development 
(DCPVTY): 
 
(1)   PCYGit = βi. DCPVTY it + η it 
 
where i (=1,2,….N) represents countries, t (=1,2,… T) represents years, βi   is the long-
run coefficient of DCPVTY and  ηit  is the error term. 
 
We are interested to know whether there exists a long run impact of financial 
development (DCPVTY) on growth and whether the short-run adjustment dynamics leads 
to the long-run relationship.   
 
Following Pesaran and Shin (1999) our panel data analysis is based on the following 
error correction representation: 
                                                                           
 
(2) ∆ PCYGit =                                                           
               p-1                           q-1 
θi (PCYGi, t-1 - βi. DCPVTY i, t-1) + Σλij ∆ PCYGi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆ DCPVTY i, t-k + µi    +  εit                
                                   j =1                      k = 0   
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where θi
 
is the country-specific error-correcting speed of adjustment term, λij and ψik  
are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µi   is the country-specific effect  and εit is the 
disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run relationship with a stable 
adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. 
 
Under this general structure Pesaran and Shin (1999) suggested the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimator. It allows intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ 
freely across the groups but the long run coefficients are constrained to be the same; that 
means, βi  = β for all i while θi    may differ from group to group. It is an intermediate 
approach between the two extremes. On one extreme we have dynamic fixed effect 
estimators (DFE) where intercepts are allowed to vary across the groups and all other 
parameters and error variances are constrained to be the same. At the other extreme one 
can estimate separate equations for each group and calculate the mean of the estimates to 
get a glimpse of the over-all picture. This is called mean group estimator (MG). Pesaran 
and Smith (1995) showed that MG gives consistent estimates of the averages of 
parameters. We have used all the three alternative techniques.  
 
Using the STATA ado developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007) we have estimated the 
equations (1) and (2). On the basis of Lag Exclusion Wald Test for each variable 
separately we have determined p=6 and q=4. 1  The MG estimate shows neither long-term 
nor short-term impact of financial development on growth (Table 3). The PMG estimate 
shows a negative (!) long-term effect of financial development on growth and there exits 
a stable adjustment path towards the long-run relationship from the insignificant short-
                                                 
1
  We have considered a uniform lag-structure for all the countries as the STATA ado used here does 
not have this option. It is theoretically possible to consider different lag structures for different countries on 
the basis of some information criteria.  
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term relationship. The DFE estimate tells the same story. Hausman test supports the PMG 
vis-à-vis MG and the DFE model vis-à-vis both PMG and MG. 
  
In view of mutual causation, we have also examined whether financial development 
depends on growth through an appropriate modification of the equations (1) and (2).  The 
MG estimates show no significant relationship. But both PMG and DFE estimates show a 
significant positive impact of growth on financial development (here also the Hausman 
test supports the DFE model).   In both models, the adjustment path to the long-term 
relationship is stable but surprisingly the short-term effect of growth on financial 
development is found to be negative (!).  
 
Summary and Concluding Observations 
 
Many economists and economic historians argued that financial services play a positive 
role in promoting growth and development. Their works provided an academic support to 
the recent move towards financial development through liberalisation and globalization 
of financial services.  
 
In this perspective we have undertaken a study of a perfectly balanced sample of 65 less 
developed countries over a long period, 1980-2006. Our analysis did not include all 
possible indicators of financial development; we considered only domestic credit to 
private sector (relative to GDP) as the best proxy. The relevant data for the other 
indicators are not readily available for a large number of countries over a long period. We 
did not consider all possible explanatory variables (which are often interlinked creating a 
problem of estimation) influencing growth as it would reduce our coverage of countries 
and time period or we would have to allow for missing data. We think that a perfectly 
balanced sample is very useful (if not a necessity) for our dynamic panel data analysis 
including tests for panel unit root and Granger causality, and lagged adjustment 
dynamics.  Moreover our methodology to estimate the relationship between financial 
development and growth takes care of the bias that may follow from omitted variables. 
Allowing for different intercepts (µi) in equation (2) takes care of the country 
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heterogeneity (including the initial condition such as initial per capita GDP often 
incorporated in the studies of convergence of income across the countries) that may 
influence our estimate of the relationships. 
 
Using Panel Granger Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
Granger Causality tests our study finds a strong evidence of mutual causation between 
financial development and growth. We have observed that financial development, more 
specifically, domestic credit to private sector (relative to GDP), has no short-term effect 
on growth; its long-term effect is negative.  On the contrary, the long-term effect of 
growth on domestic credit to private sector is positive while its short-term effect is 
negative. 
 
What is the possible explanation of our interesting findings? A full-fledged theoretical 
explanation is beyond the scope of this paper.  Our hunch is: an expansion of financial 
sector (excessive private credit expansion) relative to the real sector (as measured by 
GDP) has a harmful effect on the growth of the real sector. We can point out that the 
recent crisis of the real sector output and employment was triggered by excessive 
expansion of credit through securitisation.  It is the growth in the real sector that 
promotes financial growth in the long run; financial sector, however, cannot cope with 
real sector growth in the short-run (that’s why we observed a negative short-run impact of 
growth on credit relative to GDP).  
 
To sum up, our study of a panel of 65 countries and 27 years (1980-2006) casts serious 
doubt on the existence of a long-term as well as a short-term favourable impact of 
financial development on growth.   
14 
 
Bibliography 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Peter Howitt and David Mayer-Foulkes (2005). “The effect of financial 
development on convergence: theory and evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
120(1), 173-222. 
Arestis, Philip and Panicos O. Demetriades (1997). “Financial development and 
economic growth: assessing the evidence,” The Economic Journal, 107(May), 783–799. 
Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza (2000). “Finance and the source of 
growth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 261-300. 
Bekaert, Geert and Christian Lundblad (2005).”Does financial liberalization spur 
growth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 3-55. 
Bell, C., and P.L., Rousseau (2001). “Post-independence India: a case of finance-led 
industrialization?,” Journal of Development Economics, 65,153–175. 
Bencivenga, V.R., and B.D., Smith (1991). “Financial intermediation and endogenous 
growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 195–209. 
Blackburne III, Edward F. and Mark W. Frank (2007). “Estimation of non-stationary 
heterogeneous panels,” The Stata Journal, 7(2), 197-208. 
Buffie, Edward F. (1984). “Financial repression, the new structuralists, and stabilization 
policy in semi-industrialized economies,” Journal of Development Economics, 14, 305–
322. 
Cameron, R.E., Crisp, O., Patrick, H.T., Tilly, R. (1967). Banking in the Early Stages of 
Industrialization, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Demetriades, Panicos O. and K.A., Hussein (1996) “Does financial development cause 
economic growth?: Time-series evidence from 16 countries,” Journal of Development 
Economics, 51: 387–411. 
Demetriades, Panicos O. and Kul B. Luintel (1996). “Financial Development, Economic 
Growth and Banking Sector Controls. Evidence from India,” The Economic Journal, 106 
(435), 359-374. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Aejandro Reynoso (1989) “Financial factors in economic 
development,” American Economic Review, 79 (2), 204-209. 
15 
 
Fry, J. Maxwell (1997). “In favour of financial liberalization,” The Economic Journal, 
107(May), 754-770. 
__________ (1980). “Saving, investment, growth and the cost of financial repression,” 
World Development, 8 (April), 317-27. 
__________ (1978). “Money and capital or financial deepening in economic 
development?,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 10(4), 464-475. 
Gerschenkron, A.(1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of 
Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Goldsmith, R.W. (1969) Financial Structure and Development, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, CT. 
Greenwood, J., and B., Jovanovic (1990). “Financial development, growth, and the 
distribution of income,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1076–1107. 
Gregorio Jose de and Pablo E. Guidoti (1995). “Financial development and economic 
growth,” World Development, 23(3), 433-446. 
Gurley, J.G., and E.S., Shaw (1955). ‘Financial aspects of economic development,’ 
American Economic Review, 45, 515–538. 
Hilferding, Rudolph (1910) Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist 
Development, Routledge, London. 
Jung, W.S., (1986) ‘Financial development and economic growth: international 
evidence,’ Economic Development and Cultural Change, 34, 333–346. 
King, R.G., and R., Levine (1993). “Finance and growth: Schumpeter must be right,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 717–737. 
Levine, Ross (2003). “Stock markets liquidity and economic growth: theory and   
evidence,” in Luigi Paganetto and Edmond S. Phelps (eds), Finance, Research, 
Education and Growth, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Levine, Ross (2001). “International financial liberalisation and economic growth,” 
Review of International Economics, 9 (4), 688-702. 
_________(1997). “Financial development and economic growth: views and agenda,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 688:726. 
Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza and Thorsten Beck (2000). “Financial intermediation and 
growth: causality and causes,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 46, 31-77. 
16 
 
Levine, Ross and Sara Zervos (1998). “Stock markets, banks, and economic growth,” 
American Economic Review, 88 (3), 537-558. 
Lucas, Robert E., JR. (1988). “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22 (1), 3-42. 
Meier, Gerald M. and Dudley Seers (1984). Pioneers in Development, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
McKinnon, Ronald I. (1973). Money and Capital in Economic Development, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC. 
Patrick, H. (1966). “Financial development and economic growth in underdeveloped 
countries,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 14, 174-189. 
Pesaran, M. H., Y. Shin, and R. P. Smith (1999). “Pooled mean group estimation of 
dynamic heterogeneous panels,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 94, 621-
634. 
Pesaran, M. H., and R. P. Smith (1995). “Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic 
heterogeneous panels,” Journal of Econometrics 68, 79-113. 
Rajan, R.G., and L., Zingales (1998). “Financial dependence and growth,” American 
Economic Review, 88, 559-586. 
Quinn, Dennis (1997). “The correlates of change in international financial regulation,” 
American Political Science Review, 91(3), 531–51. 
Robinson, J. (1952). The Rate of Interest and Other Essays, Macmillan, London. 
Rousseau, P.L., and P., Wachtel (1998). “Financial intermediation and economic 
performance: historical evidence from five industrialized countries.” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 30, 675–678. 
Rousseau, Peter L. and   Dadanee Vuthipadadorn (2005). “Finance, investment, and 
growth: time series evidence from 10 Asian economies,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 27, 
87-106  
Schaberg, Marc (1999). Globalisation and the Erosion of National Financial Systems, 
Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 
Shan, Jordan Z, Alan G. Morris, and Fiona Sun (2001). “Financial development and 
economic growth: an egg-and-chicken problem?,” Review of  International Economics, 
9(3), 443-454.  
17 
 
Schumpeter, J.A.(1911). The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Shaw, E.S. (1973). Financial Deepening in Economic Development, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
Stern, Nicholas (1989). “The economics of development: a survey,” Economic Journal, 
99 (397): 597-685. 
Toda, H.Y and Yamamoto, T. (1995). “Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregressions 
with Possibly integrated Processes,” Journal of Econometrics, 66, 225-250. 
Wijnbergen, V.S.(1983). “Interest rate management in LDCs,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 12, 433–452. 
World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
18 
 
 Table 1. Domestic Credit to Private Sector/GDP Ratio (%) and Per Capita GDP: Panel Unit Root 
Tests 
 
Series/ 
Test statistics1 
Level Level First difference 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector/GDP 
Ratio (%), DCBPVTY 
Individual Effects Individual Effects and 
Linear Trend 
Individual effects 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.23209 
(0.1090) 
2.50004 
(0.9938) 
-21.60782 
(0) 
Breitung t-statistic  2.41672 
(0.9922) 
 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-statistic 
-0.96419 
(0.1675) 
2.02485 
( 0.9786) 
-23.29812 
(0) 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 164.7592 
(0.0212) 
109.961 
(0.8982) 
760.5892 
(0) 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 129.009 
(0.5081) 
 
87.4725 
(0.9984) 
839.4352 
(0) 
Growth of per capita 
real GDP, PCYG 
   
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -17.14502 
(0) 
-13.24292 
(0) 
 
Breitung t-statistic  -8.173172  
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-statistic 
-19.52512 
(0) 
-19.02682 
(0) 
 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 649.2232 
(0) 
586.2322 
(0) 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 705.6842 
(0) 
7(0)24.4332 
 
 
 
1 Automatic lag length selection based on SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion). For Levin, Lin & 
Chu t* and Breitung t-statistic, the null hypothesis of unit root assumes common unit root process. For all 
other test statistics the null hypothesis of unit root assumes individual unit root process. Probabilities are 
given in parentheses. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
2 The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at less than 5 % level of significance. 
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Table 2. Relationship between Growth and Domestic Credit to Private Sector/GDP Ratio (%), 1980-
2006: Panel VAR and VEC Granger Causality Tests 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable1 
Excluded 
Variable1 Chi-square 
Degree 
Of 
Freedom Probability 
VAR Granger 
Causality/Block 
Exogeneity Wald 
Tests 
     
Lag=2 PCYG DCBPVTY  27.87419 2  0.0000 
 
DCBPVTY PCYG  60.82316 2  0.0000 
Lag=3  
PCYG DCBPVTY  60.82316 2  0.0000 
 
DCBPVTY PCYG  70.26850 3  0.0000 
Lag=4  
PCYG DCBPVTY  23.85495 4  0.0001 
 
DCBPVTY PCYG  74.46185 4  0.0000 
Lag=5  
PCYG DCBPVTY  22.25926 5  0.0005 
 
DCBPVTY PCYG  78.65894 5  0.0000 
Lag=6  
PCYG DCBPVTY  22.40176 6  0.0010 
 DCBPVTY PCYG  79.12488 6  0.0000 
Lag=7  
PCYG DCBPVTY  18.35589 7  0.0105 
 DCBPVTY PCYG  82.27354 7  0.0000 
Lag=8  
PCYG DCBPVTY  16.62992 8  0.0342 
 DCBPVTY PCYG  80.55009 8  0.0000 
Lag=9  
PCYG DCBPVTY  17.49223 9  0.0415 
 DCBPVTY PCYG  79.56171 9  0.0000 
Lag=10  
PCYG DCBPVTY  16.64347* 10  0.0826 
 DCBPVTY PCYG  76.59189 10  0.0000 
VEC Granger 
Causality/Block 
Exogeneity Wald 
Tests 
 
    
Lag=2  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  16.15774 2  0.0003 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  12.33244 2  0.0021 
Lag=3  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  15.77599 3  0.0013 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  13.83285 3  0.0031 
Lag=4  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  17.82323 4  0.0013 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  16.44036 4  0.0025 
Lag=5  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  19.94079 5  0.0013 
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 D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  18.52651 5  0.0024 
Lag=6  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  18.64264 6  0.0048 
 D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  18.74174 6  0.0046 
Lag=7  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  12.69665* 7  0.0799 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  19.48785 7  0.0068 
Lag=8  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  16.19315 8  0.0397 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  23.11643 8  0.0032 
Lag=9  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  14.47057* 9  0.1065 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  20.72021 9  0.0140 
Lag=10  
D(PCYG) D(DCBPVTY)  15.17787* 10  0.1257 
 
D(DCBPVTY) D(PCYG)  34.57330 10  0.0001 
 
1 PCYG: Rate of Growth Real GDP per capita; 
 DCBPVTY: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP); 
D (.): First difference of the variable mentioned in parentheses. 
* Not significant at 5 per cent level; all others are highly significant. 
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Table 3. Long-run and Short-run Relationships between Growth and Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP Ratio (%), 1980-2006: Alternative Dynamic Panel Regression Estimates 
Model Pooled Mean 
Group, PMG 
Mean Group, 
MG 
Dynamic Fixed 
Effect, DFE 
Static Fixed 
Effect, FE 
A. Dependent 
Variable1:  
PCYG 
 
  
 
 
Long-run  
Relationship 
    
DCBPVTY -.152** 
(.008) 
5.429 
(5.973) 
-.064** 
(.014) 
-.044** 
(.012) 
Short-run 
Relationship 
    
θi -1.011** 
(.122) 
-1.327** 
(.126) 
-.839** 
(056) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-1 .203* 
(.103) 
.42** 
(.11) 
.017 
(.05) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-2 .14 
(.086) 
.303** 
(.094) 
.04 
(.045) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-3 .162* 
(.065) 
.267** 
(.077) 
.071 
(.039) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-4 .028 
(.045) 
.1* 
(.05) 
-.009 
(.032) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-5 .011 
(.034) 
.039 
(037) 
-.024 
(.025) 
 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t -2.587 -1.522 .006  
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(2.867) (1.828) (.019) 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t-1 5.225 
(4.993) 
7.254 
(7.051) 
-.023 
(.019) 
 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t-2 -1.984 
(2.15) 
-.859 
(.976) 
.001 
(.018) 
 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t-3 2.523 
(2.5) 
3.768 
(3.81) 
-.002 
(.018) 
 
Constant, µ 5.946** 
(1.239) 
5.337** 
(1.617) 
3.1** 
(.398) 
2.684** 
(.38) 
B. Dependent 
Variable1:  
DCBPVTY 
    
Long-run  
Relationship 
    
PCYG 9.89** 
(.868) 
-8.56 
(13.363) 
1.759** 
(.497) 
-.318** 
(.087) 
Short-run 
Relationship 
    
θi -.081** 
(.013) 
-.295** 
(.044) 
-.197** 
(.016) 
 
∆PCYGi, t -.81** 
(.14) 
-.703** 
(.205) 
-.449** 
(.082) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-1 -.526** 
(.137) 
-.437** 
(.197) 
-.233** 
(.074) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-2 -.495** 
(.134) 
-.394* 
(.156) 
-.171** 
(.066)** 
 
∆PCYGi, t-3 -.391** -.285* -.083  
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(.107) (.145) (.057) 
∆PCYGi, t-4 -.258** 
(.067) 
-.164 
(.09) 
-.092 
(.048) 
 
∆PCYGi, t-5 -.073 
(.043) 
-.006 
(.048) 
-.052 
(.037) 
 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t-1 .11** 
(  .039) 
.184** 
(.05) 
.002 
(.027) 
 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t-2 -.04 
(.04) 
.025 
(045) 
.053 
(.027) 
 
∆DCBPVTY
 i, t-3 -.04 
(.03) 
.026 
(.036) 
.147** 
(.027) 
 
Constant, µ’ 2.082** 
(.726) 
8.347** 
(1.988) 
5.951** 
(.578) 
31.9** 
(.111) 
Hausman Test Findings2 [Probability of Chi-Square (1) distribution in first parentheses] 
A. Dependent Variable: PCYG 
MG vis-à-vis PMG – Chi-Square (1) = 0.70 (0.403) [Accept Null =>  accept efficient PMG ] 
MG vis-à-vis DFE – Chi-Square (1) = 1.58 (0.209) [Accept Null =>  accept efficient DFE] 
DFE vis-à-vis PMG – Chi-Square (1) = 12.84 (0.0003) [Reject Null => accept DFE, PMG 
inconsistent 
B. Dependent Variable: DCBPVTY 
MG vis-à-vis PMG – Chi-Square (1) = 1.16 (0.282) [Accept Null =>  accept efficient PMG ] 
MG vis-à-vis DFE – Chi-Square (1) = 1.01 (0.3147) [Accept Null =>  accept efficient DFE] 
DFE vis-à-vis PMG – Chi-Square (1) = 76.89 (0) [Reject Null => accept DFE, PMG inconsistent] 
 
*  Significant at 5 per cent level. 
**  Significant at 1 per cent level. 
1 Standard errors in parentheses. 
2 The series of tests supports DFE for both cases, A and B.  
